Tuesday, August 2, 2011

Appeasement, Isolationism and the Road to War

When Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich in September 1938 promising ‘peace in our time’, he was met by cheers and congratulations from a wide range of supporters.  President Roosevelt sent a cable reading ‘good man’ and even fellow Tory critics such as Anthony Eden acknowledged some good had come from Chamberlain’s diplomatic victory.  Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin wrote Chamberlain stating ‘Millions of mothers will be blessing your name tonight for having saved their sons from the horrors of war.’  Chamberlain himself stated that his most vivid memory of the affair were the crowds and crowds of Germans cheering him as he departed Munich. Less than a year later, Great Britain and Germany were at war. [i]  

The diplomatic victory achieved at Munich was the last for Great Britain on her terms, and the last without America’s support.  At the time, Great Britain and the United States were closer together than they were further apart, but the ideology that separated them was the fundamental difference between two of the most powerful democracies.  Great Britain was a colonial empire, with over a quarter of the world falling under the jurisdiction of His Majesty’s Government.  While although the United States had a few colonial possession, they for the most part saw themselves as the defender of freedom and oppression from European imperialism. 

Politically and ideologically, Roosevelt and Chamberlain were not natural allies.  It is well documented that Chamberlain had little faith in America’s commitment to European affairs, stating ‘It is always best and safest to count on nothing from America except words.’[ii]  But the fact is that Chamberlain didn’t want a commitment from the US unless it was on Britain’s terms.  This simple fact is the key to understating Anglo-American relations before Munich.  Chamberlain feared above all that an alliance with the US would undo everything that ‘appeasement’ had stood for.  He knew if Great Britain depended too heavily on US aid, then Britain would be forced to make concessions on global trade, economic freedom and colonial home rule when it came to peace time, famously stating, ‘Heaven knows I don’t want the Americans to fight for us.  We should have to pay for that too dearly.’[iii]

The price that Britain would have to pay for American intervention was what Chamberlain thought made her great – her empire.  However, far from being Britain’s strength, the Empire was increasingly becoming a liability, undermining the government’s foreign policies to contain the aggressor powers.  After Britain and France’s victory in 1918, they assumed control of German and Ottoman possessions in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, stretching their means to the limit. At the same time Hitler was annexing half of Central Europe, Britain was trying to deal with a revolt in Palestine, Japanese aggression and territorial claims in Asia and growing unrest for home-rule in India.  In order to restore the balance and promote the prospect of peace, Britain had to relinquish some of her colonial possessions, and that was not something the British government was willing to do. 

Great Britain’s policy of ‘appeasement’ was created out the necessity to maintain balance throughout her empire.  Chamberlain, amongst others, argued that too firm of a stance in one area of the world might disturb the balance in another.  This national strategy was spelled out in a 1935 Defense Requirement Committee report:

It is a cardinal requirement of our National and Imperial security that our foreign policy should be conducted as to avoid the possible development of a situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with hostile Japan in the east, Germany in the west and any power of the main line of communication between the two.[iv]

When Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, he continued this policy as his own.  The policy focused on Britain’s strength, such as trade and finance combined with decades of diplomatic experience.  Chamberlain never intended this policy as a concession to aggressive nations, but rather to continue Britain’s long history of adjustment and accommodation of conflicting interests, while promoting the prospect of peace and political stability.  However, Chamberlain was never able to successfully implement this policy, because the foreign affairs of the late 1930’s superseded Britain’s ability to produce a ‘Grand Settlement’.

As Professor Richard Overy points out, appeasement failed because Britain lacked the strength to implement it.  Britain was in no position to meet force with force, without upsetting the balance of risk, and subsequently destroying her global dominance.  Regarded as her foremost interest, the protection of the Empire was the direct reason for Britain’s appeasement policy.  The Empire was the cornerstone of Britain’s prestige and world influence, and there is very little evidence that suggests Chamberlain would have relinquished any part of it on anybody’s terms but his own. American neutrality only encouraged the aggressor countries to push the limits of the international community, and as the League of Nations steadily lost the ability to mediate, Britain was left holding the pieces.    
   

II.

It was America’s natural position to sympathize with the victims of aggression.  However, at the height of isolationism, America’s relationship with Britain was strained at best. The Committee of Investigation of the Munitions Industry, also know as the Nye Committee after its sponsor, Republican Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota, sought to expose the munitions trading industry as the primary benefactor of America’s involvement in the First World War.  Roosevelt hoped to gain support for legislation that would allow him to nationalize the arms and munitions industry: instead Nye produced classified documents from the State Department exposing British and French financial dealings during the First World War in order to strengthen the Johnson Act of 1934. Although the committee found little evidence of conspiracy, the American public grew even more suspicious of British and French intentions. 

Still bitter over the last European war, many Americans saw Britain as manipulating foreign affairs to save her Empire and retain her economic dominance. Britain viewed the Neutrality Acts as evidence that America didn’t have the heart, or the interest in containing Hitler. Events like the Hoare-Laval Pact and the continued policy of appeasement only strengthened the isolationist’s argument and furthered Neutrality legislation.  There was a wide and popular sentiment across America that under no circumstances would the New World again be duped into doing the work of the Old World. 

In a failed attempt to ‘educate’ the American public, Roosevelt stated on 5 October 1937, ‘it seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.’[v] Roosevelt suggested that aggressor countries should be ‘quarantined’ by those favoring peace.  Chamberlain supported the policy stating, ‘…he has voiced conviction of this country as well as his own.’  Privately, Roosevelt hoped to limit aggressor countries with economic sanctions enforced by an Anglo-American naval blockade, writing a few days later ‘I’m inclined to think that this is more Christian, as well as more political, that we should go to war with them.’[vi]  However, the President’s ‘Quarantine’ speech was immediately chastised by the press and condemned by the public.  Frustrated by the public’s reaction, Roosevelt warned that turning public opinion was going to be difficult, but necessary, writing ‘I believe that as time goes on we can slowly but surely make people realize that war will be a greater danger to us if close all the doors and windows than if we go out in the street and use our influence to curb the riot.’[vii]

Consequently, Chamberlain’s distrust of America grew. Aware of the Prime Minister’s indifference towards the US, Roosevelt told his Secretary of Commerce, Henry Morganthau, ‘We must recognize that fundamentally, he dislikes Americans.’ So when Roosevelt approached Chamberlain in January 1938 with a ‘peace plan’ to establish an international organization founded on the ideals of peace, disarmament and free trade, Chamberlain dismissed as ‘domestic consumption.’  Chamberlain had no faith in ‘collective security’ and feared American involvement would be disruptive just when he felt Britain was gaining the upper hand: ‘They [Germany and Italy] might even use it to postpone conversations with us if we were associated with it – they would see it as another attempt on the part of the democratic bloc to put the dictators in the wrong.’[viii]

Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, protested, declaring he would rather give the dictators a chance to break ties with the West, than risk good relations with the US.  In the end, Roosevelt postponed the plan and Eden resigned shortly after in protest of Chamberlain’s methods of appeasement.  This was truly the low point of Anglo-American relations leading up to war.   

After the failed ‘Peace Plan’, Roosevelt gave up on turning Britain away from appeasement and focused on an ‘unneutral re-armament’ effort.  Re-armament was seen by both Roosevelt and Chamberlain as a deterrent to war: an alternative rather than preparation.  On 28 January, the President went before Congress and asked for funds to increase the armament program solely on the basis that, in comparison to other nations, the US had inadequate land and sea defenses.  Secretary of State Cordell Hull specifically targeted the naval re-armament program arguing that it was the duty of the current administration to do everything possible to prevent being drawn into war because of ill-prepared measures. 

After Munich, Roosevelt re-called his Ambassador to Paris, William C. Bullitt, to assess Chamberlain’s agreement.  Amongst other things, Bullitt expressed the growing anxiety within the British and French public, particularly in London and Paris, of Germany’s intentions of mass aerial bombardment.  Privately, Roosevelt believed that the Allies would not be able to withstand such terror.  He told Bullitt that if Hitler successfully unleashed a campaign of terror, that France and Britain could very well be defeated.  Furthermore, Bullitt told Roosevelt that French Prime Minister wouldn’t have signed the agreement if France had three to four thousand more military aircraft.  The next day Roosevelt told reporters that he wanted $500 million appropriated to the defense budget for the production of military aircraft. 

In January 1939, Roosevelt followed up his promise for an increased defense budget by asking the Senate Appropriations Committee for 500 million dollars for military spending. He also began attacking the neutrality laws arguing the existing laws ‘may actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim.’  In a meeting with the Senate Military Affairs Committee on 31 January, the President candidly revealed his true intention in aiding the British and French.  He proposed a policy of ‘Cash and Carry’ that would provide significant war materials to the Allies, while denying access to Italy and Germany.  Playing on the fear of the Committee, Roosevelt stated that as it stood, Hitler and Mussolini had a 50/50 chance on defeating the Allies. Although the President acknowledged that this may be an ‘unnuetral’ policy of ‘self protection’, he argued that it was the best way to reduce the possibility of war coming to the United States. [ix]


[i] Richard Overy, The Road to War.  (Macmillian: London, 1989), pg. 89.
[ii] Overy, Origin, pg. 22.
[iii] Chamberlain to Ida, 27 Jan. 1940, NC 18/1/1140
[iv] Overy, Origins, pg. 17.
[v] State Release 1937, No.419, pg. 279.
[vi] Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor, pg. 38.
[vii] Overy, TRTW, pg. 275-276
[viii] Reynolds, Alliance. Pg. 126.
[ix] Reynolds, Munich to Pearl Harbor, pg. 47.